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mind, and further noted that the act was intended to strengthen manage-
ment's position at the bargaining table. 24
 In view of the instant court's
basing its decision on a distinction between dues and assessments, yet failing
to show why this point is determinative, some reference to the overall pur-
pose of the act could and should have been made. However, considering the
Board's position and the Court of Appeals' decisions in the Guided Missile
Lodge and Food Fair cases, with the implicit reluctance to add to the bar-
gaining power of the union in construing 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) of the act,
it appears that any solution will have to come from Congress.
STEPHEN M. RICHMOND
Labor Law—Superseniority Policies—Relevance of Employer's Motive.
—Erie Resistor Corp. v. NLRB. 1—During an economic strike, the Com-
pany, after a sharp decline in business and loss of important orders, hired
replacements including new employees and returning strikers, and offered
tenure to replacements over strikers returning upon settlement of the
strike as an inducement to cross picket lines. The Company established a
superseniority policy to implement its assurances of tenure under which
the replacements were to receive twenty years added to their regular
length of service. After settlement of the strike, the Company filled still-
vacant places with returning employees according to seniority. Several
months later a number of employees were laid off for economic reasons,
including some recalled strikers whose seniority was now comparatively
low because of the superseniority plan. The Union's complaint that the
preferential seniority plan was an unfair labor practice was recommended
for dismissal as the evidence did not support a determination that the
Company's action was prompted by an improper motive. The Board ruled,
however, that the adoption of preferential seniority was inherently dis-
criminatory, the Company's motive being wholly irrelevant. 2 In denying
enforcement of the Board's cease and desist order, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit HELD: The implementation by the Company of a
superseniority plan, although discriminatory, is not a violation of section
8(a) (3) 3 of the National Labor Relations Act unless motivated by a desire
to discourage or encourage membership in a labor organization. The adoption
of preferential seniority to assure tenure to replacements is proper if the
Company is motivated solely by necessity to protect and continue its
business.
24 Id. at 660.
1 303 F.2d 359 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 83 Sup. Ct. 48 (1962).
2 132 N.L.R.13. 621, 48 L.R.R.M. 1379 (1961).
3 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(1958), as amended by Pub. L. 86-257, § 201(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(3) (i) (1959), provides:
Section 8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment .. - to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . .
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It was soon decided after the passage of the National Labor Relations
Act that the employer would not be required to stand idly by during a
strike while his business was being ruined. To allow such to happen would
give grossly disproportionate power to the unions by forcing the employer
to accept any and all demands of the unions or face complete ruin. In
1938 the United States Supreme Court ruled in NLRB v. Mackay Radio
& Tel. Co.4
 that during an economic strikes the employer did not lose his
right to protect and continue his business and that it was not an unfair
labor practice to implement this right by hiring replacements and giving
assurances of permanent tenure as against returning strikers. Further, it
was a legitimate exercise of an attempt to protect his business for an
employer to reinstate only those returning strikers whose places remained
vacant.
How far an employer may go in the legitimate exercise of his right to
protect his business has been the subject of litigation concerning the grant-
ing of preferential seniority to replacements during an economic strike. It
is important to note at the outset that the courts have not given full con-
sideration to the implications involved in the granting of superseniority.
In no case have the courts mentioned the economic impact of superseniority
or its effects on reinstated strikers, two relevant and important factors in
determining whether an act of the employer has tended to encourage or
discourage union activity. The courts have, instead, extended the language
of the Mackay case, which was intended for a narrow fact situation, to
mean that the controlling factor in the actions of the employer is his motive.
In NLRB v. Potlatch Forests, Inc.,e the Ninth Circuit upheld the employer's
adoption of preferential seniority in favor of replacements where it was
imposed "for a legitimate business purpose." The fact that the inevitable
consequence was discrimination against union activity was not sufficient
to find an unfair labor practice. The court rejected the Board's position
that an offer of superseniority is inherently illegal.'
While the employer may know that hiring replacements tends to
dissipate the effects of the strike, and thereby tends to discourage
union activities, such conduct is regarded as a legitimate weapon
of economic warfare. . .. because the benefit conferred upon the
4 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
There arc two kinds of strikes which must be distinguished: (1) an unfair labor
practice strike; (2) an economic strike. In an unfair labor practice strike employees
are striking because of action of the employer which is in violation of the rights of
the employees under NLRA. In this instance the employer must reinstate all striking
employees upon termination of the strike. An economic strike results when the
employer and employees dispute provisions of a contract between them as to such
matters as wages or conditions of employment. The courts have been consistent in
not requiring the employer to reinstate all striking employees once the strike is over,
but that the employer need only reinstate those employees not replaced during the
strike. Id. at 344.
6 189 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1951).
7 87 N.L.R.B. 1193, 25 L.R.R.M. 1192 (1949). The Board affirmed the rulings of
the Trial Examiner that the establishment of preferential seniority does not come
within the Mackay decision since preferential seniority impairs the reinstated employees'
employment relationship which the court in Mackay found to be a prohibited action.
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replacements is a benefit reasonably appropriate for the employer
to confer in attempting 'to protect and continue his business . . .
If an employer could show that he was motivated by the desire to protect
and continue his business, superseniority was permissible.
The Fourth Circuit, in Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. NLRB,° em-
phasized certain criteria to determine the validity of the employer's conduct,
which placed strict limitations on the broad language of the Potlatch case.
The court made the holding in Mackay more explicit, stating that
with a strike in progress, the primary concern of the employer is
to keep his plant in operation. It is then proper for an employer,
who might be unable to procure replacement save upon a promise
of permanent tenure, to promise such tenure to replacements.
But when the strike is over, when the plant is in operation, then
the imposition of the superseniority policy in favor of the replace-
ments and against the strikers is quite a different matter)°
Unless the superseniority had been promised during the strike as an induce-
ment to accept employment in order to keep the plant in operation, the
adoption of a superseniority policy once the strike is over, and there is no
impelling economic reason for adopting such a policy, clearly indicates
that the employer seeks to punish the strikers for participating in union
activities. The court, therefore, upheld the Board's ruling, but did not rule
directly that superseniority was illegal per se. The same rationale of Olin
Mathieson was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. California Date
Growers Ass'n" in upholding a Board finding that the employer engaged
in an unfair labor practice by adopting preferential seniority after the
strike was settled as a penalty for striking. The court indicated that the
granting of superseniority would be permissible under the National Labor
Relations Act in particular situations. Thus, as in Olin Mathieson, the
court did not hold that superseniority was illegal, but rather, because the
employer sought to implement the policy when there was no need for it,
there was a clear indication that the employer was motivated by a desire to
punish the strikers.
The National Labor Relations Board has been quite adamant in holding
the employer to strict observation of section 8(a) (3) in cases involving
superseniority, but the courts have consistently avoided the problem by
deciding the cases on points other than the inherent legality of super-
seniority. Such an approach seems to indicate that superseniority is not
illegal per se, but that the particular facts of each case must be considered
in determining the validity of preferential seniority, and the employer's
motive is a crucial factor in such determination. The case law points out
that if the evidence indicates that the employer's business is in danger
of ruin, if inducements are necessary to attract replacements and if the
employer is motivated by a desire to protect and continue his business
Supra note 6, at 86.
" 232 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 1020 (1957).
10 Id. at 161-62.
11 259 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1958).
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and not to punish the strikers, the courts would sanction the employer's
establishment of preferential seniority for replacements." Thus, when the
Board in the instant case ruled "that superseniority however motivated
was an illegal discrimination against strikers,"" the Third Circuit found
on review that it was too well established that, given the appropriate
circumstances, preferential seniority would be proper:"
In the Erie Resistor case, the Board claimed support for holding super-
seniority illegal per se in Radio Officer's Commercial Telegraphers Union v.
NLRB," where the Supreme Court stated that "specific evidence of intent
to encourage or discourage is not an indispensible element of proof of viola-
tion of section 8(a) (3)." This applied to situations "inherently conducive
to increased union membership." The Board in Eric Resistor found the
superseniority policy to'be discriminatory and on its face clearly discourag-
ing strike activities and union membership. "Such was the inevitable result
of a preference granted for all time to those who did not join the Union's
strike activities." 18 (Emphasis supplied.) The Board interpreted the
Radio Officer's case as giving it wide latitude to determine that certain
actions of the employer are illegal per se if, as a consequence of such
actions, there was discrimination based on protected union activities
regardless of the reason for such conduct. This Board view was rejected
by the Ninth Circuit in Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. N.LRB 17 where
it stated:
Where criteria other than union membership or activity are
used as the basis for an employer's discrimination, the exceptional
rule of Radio Officer's does not apply since the kind of discrim-
ination which impelled the rule is absent. It is then up to the
Board to predicate a conclusion of unlawful intent upon more
specific evidence; a showing of the discriminatory treatment plus
its natural and foreseeable consequences will not suffice."
12 Comment, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 368, 376 (1960). The writer sums up the criteria
as follows:
To allow an employer to use permanent tenure or superseniority as a weapon
against striking employees or to reward non-strikers would clearly be beyond
the Mackay doctrine. Only where the employer can prove that promises of
permanent tenure or seniority to replacements were reasonably necessary to
induce replacements to cross picket lines during a strike, and that such
promises were made at such a time that they would act as an inducement
should the employer be allowed to adopt and implement a superseniority plan.
12 Supra note 2, at 625.
14 The court stated:
We are of the opinion that inherent in the right of an employer to replace
strikers during a strike is the concomitant right to adopt a preferential seniority
policy which will assure the replacements of some form of tenure, provided the
policy is adopted SOLELY to protect and continue the business of the employer.
Supra note 1, at 364.
15 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
16 Supra note 2, at 630.
17 284 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1960).
18 Id. at 83.
441
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The court further stated:
That [a] protected union activity is the direct cause of a business
condition upon which an employer actually predicates discrim-
ination among his employees does not mean that the basis for
discrimination is the protected union activity."
Thus, according to this view, the fact that the union's right to strike is a
protected activity would not prevent the employer from exercising his
right to hire replacements, based on economic conditions, to protect and
continue his business even though such conditions are created by the strike.
The fact that the employer's conduct is foreseeably discriminatory does not
bring the conduct within the Radio Officer's rule. It appears that the
courts do not give much weight to the argument of the Board that even
though an employer may be allowed to hire replacements, the preferred
treatment here utilized goes beyond protecting replacements against lay-off
when the strike is terminated, and in effect destroys the right to strike.
The climax of the litigation as to granting preferential seniority has been
precipitated by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In the case of
Ballas Egg Prod., Inc. v. NLRB," the court did not rule, nor did the
Board, that adoption of a superseniority policy was inherently illegal, but
rather that the employer's motivation was improper. This case follows the
Olin Mathieson and the California Date Growers cases in circumventing the
question of the inherent illegality of preferential seniority. In Swarco, Inc. v.
NLRB,21
 however, the court met head on with the issue and sustained the
Board's ruling that the adoption of preferential seniority by the employer was
illegal, the court in effect holding that it was illegal per se. It stated that
whether granting superseniority is a violation of section 8(a) (3) is a
question of fact to be decided on the particular facts of the case, and, by
basing its decision largely on NLRB v. Bradley Wash fountain Co., 22 it
reached the conclusion that the adoption of the superseniority policy by
10 Id. at 84. One of the situations not intended to be covered by the rule not
requiring specific evidence of intent was expressed by the court as follows:
Discussion in (Olin Mathieson Corp. and California Date Growers Ass'n] indicates
that when in order to obtain replacements for economic strikers, it is necessary
for an employer to promise seniority to the replacements, the denial of seniority
status to those strikers who are reinstated is not an unfair labor practice, although
the business condition which actuated the employer to deny seniority status to
reinstated strikers was directly caused by the strike itself.
20
 283 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1960).
21
 303 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1962).
22
 192 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1951). The court held the communications between
employer and employees to be protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution, so long as there are no threats of reprisal or promise of benefit. "If the com-
munications are fair in their description of the situation and they do not offer the return-
ing employees greater benefits than will be extended to those remaining on strike, they do
not support a finding of unfair labor practices." Id. at 153. The court, however, refers
to the Mackay case primarily to show that an employer may replace economic strikers
and refuse to lay off replacements upon termination of the strike. In so doing, portions
of the Mackay decision are included, which stated that an employer may promise re-
placements permanent tenure, which appears to be a definite benefit over those who
remained on strike.
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Swarco "constituted an inducement to give up the strike and a threat of
reprisal to those who continued the strike," 23
 and was thus illegal. The court
made the point quite emphatic when it cited the Radio Of icer's case
implying that the adoption of superseniority did faIl within the Radio
Officer's rule, and is thus inherently illegal. " 'Thus an employer's protestation
that he did not intend to encourage or discourage must be unavailing where
a natural consequence of his action was such encouragement or discourage-
ment.' "24
It is to be noted that all the other cases dealing with preferential
seniority were decided on facts which clearly established that the employer
was impelled by anti-union sentiments. Other than Potlatch, which the
Swarco court distinguishes, Swarco for the first time attacks the validity
of superseniority policies and agrees with the Board that the consequences
of such policy go beyond the legitimate exercise of the employer's right
to protect his business. Although previous cases have indicated that
superseniority would be valid if adopted to induce replacements to cross
picket lines, this indication is found in dicta.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, within eight days of the
Swarco decision, handed down its ruling on the same question dealt with
in Swarco, but came up with the opposite result. The court in the Erie
Resistor case overruled the Board, holding that the motive of the employer
is the crucial consideration in determining whether the adoption of a
superseniority policy is proper. The court did not decide whether the
employer was improperly motivated, the question being one of fact for the
Board. Particular emphasis was placed on the Radio Officer's case, and
implicit in the Erie court's discussion of that case was the interpretation
of Radio Officer's expressed in the Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. case.
The court felt there that specific intent need not be found where discrimina-
tion is based on union membership. However, in Erie, as in the Pittsburgh-
Des Moines case, the employer adopted a preferential seniority policy based
on economic necessity, not on union membership or union activity, and
therefore the Radio Officer's rule does not apply. The decision in Erie gives
authority to the implications found in Olin Mathieson and California Date
Growers that if the employer is impelled by the desire to protect and con-
tinue his business, and if the inducement is given to replacements during
the strike, preferential seniority would not be an unfair labor practice.
From a review of the cases previous to Erie, the decision in Erie is not
too surprising, and it would seem that the cases follow in logical sequence.
The Swarco case, however, unsettles any definitive status of the question of
the validity of superseniority policies. While the decision of the Swarco
court distinguishes the previous cases the rationale for its result is rather
obscure. It is implicit that the court is persuaded by the Board's argument,25
but does not make that argument clear in its opinion, thereby not availing
23 Supra note 21, at 673.
24 Ibid.
25
 Supra note 2. See also Griffin Pipe Div. of Griffin Wheel Co. v. NLRB, 136
N.L.R.B. No. 144, 50 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1962), pending on petition to review in Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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itself of the opportunity to indicate the possibly erroneous approach taken
by the courts in regard to superseniority.
It is one thing to assure replacements that they will not lose their
jobs upon termination of the strike by granting permanent tenure to that
time; it is another thing to give seniority which will secure replacements
against possible lay-off in the future because of economic conditions not
directly related to the strike. This latter point seems to go beyond the
Mackay doctrine. The Board has made the point quite clear:
Mackay itself holds that, as 'employees,' strikers may not be
discriminated against in the manner of, and the terms of, their
reinstatement. Yet, giving 20 years or any other special seniority
to strike replacements necessarily deprives unreplaced strikers
of an important aspect of their prestrike status, for seniority is
by its nature relative; giving to one necessarily takes away from
another. In essence, therefore, an award of superseniority to
strike replacements renders one important requirement of Mackay
—nondiscriminatory and complete reinstatement of unreplaced
strikers—an actual impossibility."
This argument should not be overlooked because it points up a latent
defect in the reasoning and meaning given to a preferential seniority policy
by the courts. While the attempt is being made to secure the employer's
right to protect and continue his business, the union is left, however
unintentionally, without such ability to protect and continue its purposes
and activities. It seems more logical that the court in Mackay intended
to allow, as an inducement to cross picket lines, the granting of job security
to replacements over the returning strikers upon termination of the strike,
and that the replacements, as well as all other employees, would be subject to
lay-off due to future economic conditions according to seniority actually
accrued. To interpret the Mackay decision as holding that the promise of
tenure will apply as to future economic conditions seems grossly inaccurate.
The Supreme Court is now directly faced with the problem, 27 and its
decision should do much to clear up the confusion on the question of
superseniority and the effect of the employer's motive.
EDWARD BOGRAD
Labor Law—Unfair Labor Practices—, Interference, Restraint or Co-
ercion—Unconditional Pre-Election Benefits.—NLRB v. Exchange Parts
Co.' —Two weeks before a scheduled union representation election, the
Exchange Parts Company, in a letter urging employees to vote against the
union, announced the granting of extra vacation periods and increased
holiday overtime pay. Some of the benefits had been settled on prior to
26 Supra note 2, at 626.
27 Certiorari was granted to the Board in the Erie case, 83 Sup. Ct. 48 (1962).
Petition for certiorari has been filed in the Swarco case.
304 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1962).
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